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Rock, Scissors, Paper: the Problem of Incentives and Information in 
Traditional Chinese State and the Origin of Great Divergence  
Debin Ma 
 
Abstract 
This article posits that the political institution of imperial China – its 
unitary and centralized ruling structure – is an essential 
determinant to China‘s long-run economic trajectory and its early 
modern divergence from Western Europe. Drawing on institutional 
economics, I demonstrate that monopoly rule, a long time-horizon 
and the large size of the empire could give rise to a path of low-
taxation and dynastic stability in imperial China. But fundamental 
incentive misalignment and information asymmetry problems 
within its centralized and hierarchical political structure also 
constrained the development the fiscal and financial capacity of 
the Chinese state. Based on a reconstruction of two millennia 
records of incidences of warfare, this paper develops a narrative to 
show that the establishment and consolidation towards a single 
unitary monopoly of political power was an endogenous historical 
process. Using data series on warfare and government revenue 
for 17-19th century, I illustrate the Qing imperial rule as an epitome 
of the traditional Chinese political economy.  
 
 
Why did China, given her economic and technological leadership in 
the 14th century or even in the 18th century as some have recently 
claimed, fail to become the first industrial nation?  A multitude of 
hypotheses ranging from cultural and scientific traditions to factor 
                                               
 I benefitted greatly from discussion with Loren Brandt, Mark Dincecco, Phil Hoffman, 
Cai Hongbin, Peter Lindert, Liu Guanlin, Paul Davis, Brad Delong, Long Denggao, 
Avner Greif, Deirdre McCloskey, Joel Mokyr, Patrick O‘Brien, Maarten Prak, Leandro 
Prados de la Escosura, Kenneth Pomeranz, Paul Rhode, Thomas Rawski, Tirthankar 
Roy, Shi Zhihong, Tuan-Hwee Sng, Jan Luiten van Zanden, Oliver Volckhart, Gavin 
Wright, Yan Se, Yuan Weipeng and Zhou Li-an and the seminar participants at 
University of Utrecht, the Netherlands, LSE, University of Carlos III, Madrid, Fudan 
University, Tsinghua University, Guanghua School of Business, Beijing University, UC 
Berkeley, Stanford University, Northwestern University, University of Michigan, IMT 
(Luca, Italy) and University of Pompeu Fabra (Spain). Research for this paper is 
supported by Global Price and Income Project funded by NSF under the leadership of 
Peter Lindert and European Commission's 7th Framework Programme for Research 
“Historical Patterns of Development and Underdevelopment: Origins and Persistence 
of the Great Divergence”(HI-POD). I alone remain responsible all the errors. 
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endowments or natural resources have been proposed. 1  One long-
standing thesis to account for China‘s long-term stagnation, argued from 
a European comparative perspective, is the absence of dynamic inter-
state competition occasioned by the precocious rise of a unitary and 
centralized state in historical China. This argument found numerous 
expressions in various academic and popular writings.2  As plausible as it 
may be, this thesis is qualified or challenged at least on two fronts. Firstly, 
the mechanism of how political fragmentation or inter-state competition 
(as in the European context) directly impact property rights and contract 
enforcement – factors viewed as fundamental to long-term economic 
growth – has yet to be properly identified.  Indeed, the recent revisionist 
China historians claimed that the Imperial rule of benevolence in 
traditional China provided an institutional framework that taxed the 
peasantry lightly, protected private property rights and interfered little in 
the operation of a well-establishment markets in land and labour (see 
Pomeranz 2000 and Wong 1997). 
Secondly, as pointed out by S.R. Epstein (2000), the inter-state 
competition thesis even faces challenge on the European front. Political 
or jurisdictional fragmentation, as he emphasized, may have actually 
acted to shackle long-term growth in the Medieval and early modern 
Europe by way of massive coordination failures caused by the absence of 
undivided sovereignty over the political and economic spheres.  This line 
of logic led him to surmise that England‘s rise to global eminence in the 
18th century had to more to do with a more conducive institutional 
environment emanated – not from jurisdictional fragmentation – but from 
its precocious institutional unification and centralization due to its 
comparative weakness of entrenched ―corporate‖ interest (Epstein, pp. 
36-7).  
                                               
1  See Ma 2004 for a summary of these hypotheses.  
2  The latest rehashing of this thesis appears in Niall Ferguson‘s, Civilization, the West 
and the Rest, see chapter one.  
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The Chinese imperial political structure, marked by a centralized and 
unitary state and evolved in relative isolation, offers a fascinating test 
case on the relationship between political institution and long-economic 
growth. Surprisingly, political institution has figured little in the debate on 
the divergence between China and Western Europe. Part of the reason 
for this cant attention is that the historiography on the role of traditional 
Chinese state had long been dominated and clouded by the overly 
simplistic framework oriental despotism or theories of class struggle in the 
official Communist ideology.3 
This article draws on the insights of new institutional economics to 
delineate the political logic of Chinese empire and dynastic cycles4 In the 
spirit of Olson (1993), this article develops a historical narrative and 
empirical evidences to show that given ruler‘ monopoly of power and long 
time-horizon, an absolutist regime with total power as in imperial China 
could achieve a relatively stable path of low fiscal extraction co-existing 
with a relatively free private sector. Going beyond Olson, however, I 
develop a framework with three major actors: the emperor, the 
bureaucracy and the people, to incorporate the principal-agent problem 
with asymmetric information as embedded in a centralized hierarchical 
political system. I argue that fundamental incentive misalignment and 
information asymmetry problem among these three actors (or a double 
principal-agent problem) under a centralized and hierarchical political 
structure added a new dimension of constraining the power (or the 
grabbing hands) of the Chinese emperor and/or bureaucracy. Indeed, 
given steam of revenue associated with the long-term horizon of 
monopoly rule and the constraints of double principal-agent problems, the 
objective function of the imperial rulers would shift from short-run revenue 
                                               
3 For oriental despotism, see Wittfogel (1957). Also see Wang Yanan (1981) for a 
condemnation of the traditional Chinese state from a Marxist perspective.   
4 For new institutional economics literature related to state, see North 1981, Olson 
1993, North, Wallis and Weingast 2009.  
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maximization to long-term defence of monopoly rents.  Over time, fiscal 
extraction and tax revenue maximization could become secondary to the 
survival and extension of rule, which itself hinged on the defusing of 
internal insurrection and elimination of alternative or contending sources 
of political power. The historical stability of this particular equilibrium also 
gave rise to a certain long-term trajectory where political stability and 
dynastic survival took precedence over other objectives, including 
economic growth. Hence, dynastic instability or overthrows can be viewed 
as temporal deviations from the long-term trajectory where the traditional 
pecking-order of the three actors (emperor-bureaucracy-masses) 
reversed often violently as in a game of rock-scissors-paper.  
This article illustrates the above thesis through a historical narrative 
and the presentation of systemic time series on warfare and taxation in 
China. Through a reconstruction of two indices of imperial unification 
based on two millennia's recorded incidences of warfare, I develop a 
narrative to show that the establishment and consolidation towards a 
single unitary monopoly of political power was an evolutionary and 
endogenous historical process achieved through long gestation of cultural 
and institutional integration that shaped and reshaped private property 
rights and factor markets.  A detailed examination of public finance and its 
linkage with warfare and rebellion in 17-19th century reveals that the Qing 
imperial rule in the 18th century epitomized the virtuous equilibrium of low-
extraction and dynastic stability. My quantitative indices, presented in a 
comparative perspective, show that imperial Chinese performance as 
measured by dynastic stability, imperial unity and fiscal extraction was 
unparalleled among major civilizations including Western Europe. But the 
stability and ultimately, inertia along this long-term Chinese trajectory 
looked flaccid by the early modern era, pitched against an advancing 
Europe whose institutional dynamism may have derived from, as I argue, 
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a unique symbiosis of inter-state competition and representation 
institution of some sort (within the polity).  
I divide the paper into three main sections followed by a conclusion. 
The first section provides a historical narrative on the model and evolution 
of traditional Chinese political structure and its theoretical implications. 
The second section examines the historical record of the traditional 
Chinese political governance model using two reconstructed indices of 
imperial unification contrasted against a two and a half millennia data 
series of warfare. It then focuses on the fiscal regime for Qing China 
(1644-1911) in a comparative perspective. The third section analyzes the 
problem of incentives and information and its relevance for understanding 
China‘s early modern divergence with English and Western European 
states.      
 
 
I.  Absolutism with Chinese Characteristics  
The Origin of a Model 
In the era of disintegration following the collapse of the legendary 
Zhou dynasty in the Northern Chinese plain around the 7th century BC, 
thousands of marauding and competing states were slowly absorbed and 
consolidated under a handful of rulers who excelled in mobilizing for 
warfare through the adoption of administrative reform (see the Appendix 
Table for China‘s dynastic chronology).  Du Zhengshen‘s in-depth study 
encapsulates the rulers‘ winning strategies of the Warring State period in 
the classical Chinese phrase of ―Bianhu Qimin‖ which could be literally 
translated as ―registering the household and homogenizing the people.‖  
These measures, that eventually led to China‘s first unification by the 
state of Qin in the second century BC, included the replacement of local 
feudal control with direct administrative rule under the prefectural system, 
the establishment of military-based meritocracy in place of hereditary 
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nobility (hence ―homogenizing the people‖), the allocation and registration 
of agricultural land and households for direct taxation and military 
conscription and the promulgation of standardized legal codes under a 
system of collective punishment. Du traced the origin of the prefectural 
system (郡县制) at the local level to the organization of military infantry.5  
From the founding of the Chinese empire in Qin (221 – 206 BC) 
until the fall of the last Imperial Qing dynasty in 1911, both the concept 
and practice of centralized rule with a hierarchical bureaucracy had been 
indisputably its most distinguishing and enduring characteristics   We start 
with a description of this political model of governance or, to borrow a 
terminology from Max Weber, its ideal type before we turn to its historical 
evolution.  In this model of absolutist regime, ultimate power was vested 
in the emperor who commanded property rights over all factors of 
production including land and labour.  At the other or lower end of the 
spectrum are the people or masses (farmers or peasants in an agrarian 
regime) who are nominally the tenants and cultivators of land and 
resources owned by the emperor.6  The Imperial household is entitled to 
rents from agricultural output, the bulk of which went into the supply of 
external defence and internal security.   
In this model, the dominance of a single imperial household over all 
social or political groups is essential.  At the founding of the Qin empire, 
China‘s First Emperor Qin Shi Huang (秦始皇), followed the advice of his 
Legalist (法家) chancellor, Lishi (李斯) and opted against a feudal (封建) 
type of political arrangement where the imperial power would co-exist with 
various regional elites or aristocrats often with hereditary status.  Instead, 
                                               
5 See Greel, 1964 for an in-depth description of the origin of the prefectural system (郡
县制) in China.  
6  The imperial ownership of land is expressed by the traditional notion of ‗Wang-tu 
wang-min (王土王民, king‘s land, king‘s people)‘, which appeared in The Book of Songs 
compiled during the age of Warring States (403-221 B.C.) and persisted throughout the 
imperial period; see Kishimoto 2011.  
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they implemented a prefectural system (郡县制) of empire-wide 
administrative units and household registration ―bianhu qimin‖ (编戸齐民).  
In this new regime, only the status of the imperial throne is hereditary. 
With the elimination of aristocracy or self-contained political units, the 
administration of the empire – tax collection, suppression of violence and 
some provision of minimal public goods – would be governed by direct 
imperial rules and orders (律令) executed by an impersonal bureaucracy.7 
We illustrate the logic of the tri-part political model in the words of 
the great Tang Confucius scholar, Han-Yu (韩愈 786-824): ―… rulers are 
meant to give commands which are carried out by their officials and made 
known to the people, and the people produce grain, rice, hemp, and silk, 
make utensils and exchange commodities for the support of the 
superiors. If the ruler fails to issue commands, then he ceases to be a 
ruler, while if his subordinates do not carry them out and extend them to 
the people, and if the people do not produce goods for the support of their 
superiors, they must be punished.‖ (Wm. Theodore de Bary et al, 1960 
pp. 432-3).  
This Chinese concept of the state, as recognized by generations of 
scholars, is in many ways an extension of the Chinese concept of a 
patriarchal household.  With the elimination of hereditary aristocracy, the 
transition from feudalism to central rule extended the stand-alone imperial 
household (家) into the national sovereign (国).  Indeed, the unity of 
individual, family and state is encapsulated in the enduring Confucian 
adage that one needs first to cultivate himself, then his household, then 
his own state properly, in order to finally realize virtues for all under the 
                                               
7 The stand-alone nature of Chinese rulers was consistent with countless historical 
examples of the rulers turning against the landed or commercial elites as well as 
bureaucrats. For Ming emperors‘ brutal punishment of landlords and bureaucrats see 
Huang 1974. For a critique of how this important distinction between Chinese and 
Western political regime had been blurred by the dogmatic application of Marxist 
ideology in China, see Feng 2006.  
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heaven and (修身 齐家 治国 平天下). The literal translation of the Chinese 
character for nation-state (国家) is really ―state-family‖ or what Max 
Weber termed as a patrimonial or ―familistic state‖.  Etymology used by 
Qian Mu reveals what was the equivalent Chinese term of ―chancellor‖ (宰
相) for the empire derived from titles that denoted managers of private 
royal households in the pre-Qin period.   Thus, for Qian Mu, the rise of 
central rule also marks the beginning of a separation between ownership 
(the Imperial ruler) and management (the bureaucracy).8  
 
The Evolution of the Model  
Qin‘s bloody unification did not mark the end of all violence or 
political fragmentation in Chinese history.  On the contrary, its violent 
collapse under the weight of rebellion after a mere 15 years in existence 
taught a lesson on the fragility of political rule by brute force alone. 
Attempts to re-feudalize in early Han and the subsequent reinstatement of 
Confucius teaching with its emphasis on an imperial rule of benevolence 
and the paternal social hierarchy as the new orthodox state ideology – 
previously persecuted under the Qin – all aimed at correcting the 
excesses of Qin despotism rooted in the harsh Legalist principles of 
punishment and discipline. 
The diffusion of Confucian ideology as the new orthodoxy and the 
sustained military rivalry of regional powers gave rise to new ruling elites 
dominated by powerful and enduring lineages during China‘s so-called 
age of aristocracy roughly between the 3rd and 8th century. In this age, 
powerful lineages monopolized schools of Confucius learning, practiced 
endogamy, dominated the imperial court and conducted state affairs 
within closed cabinet meetings. Indeed, many of the aristocrats claimed 
more illustrious lineage than the emperors. As the post of the emperor 
                                               
8 See Qian, 1966, pp.8-12. Also see H. G Creel 1964 and Du 1990 for arguments on 
the clan and kingship origin of the Chinese state.  
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was the property of these aristocratic families and relatives, the emperor 
could be dethroned or even murdered if the interests of the aristocracy 
were violated. Dynastic struggles were largely the business of aristocrats 
or lineages unconnected to the lives of the commoners. In Tang‘s central 
government, the wing of bureaucrats that reflected the opinions of 
aristocracy had the right to challenge or even veto (封驳) imperial edicts 
drafted by the imperial secretariat. And the chancellor, the head of the 
ruling bureaucracy, had considerable power and shared final decisions 
with the emperor.  
But from the Song dynasty onwards the balance of power had 
decisively titled towards the imperial throne with the emperor taking over 
all state functions and commanding submission of his bureaucracy like a 
master to his slaves. The right of challenge or veto disappeared from the 
Ming dynasty onwards and even the post of chancellorship was abolished 
by the first Ming emperor. Medieval China‘s turn towards absolutism 
marked the pivotal turning-point now more popularly known as the Tang-
Song transformation as originally expounded by the Japan‘s foremost 
China scholar, Konan Naito. The so-called Naito thesis premised that the 
ascendancy of Chinese absolutist rule, despite its attendant dire 
implications, marked the beginning of China‘s modern era. It freed the 
commoners from the yoke of the aristocracy and took them in as tenants 
of the state, ushering in a series of institutional transformations ranging 
through fiscal and monetary regimes to ultimately the property rights 
regimes for man and land.9    
The first transformation came in the recruitment of bureaucrats. 
Although the civil service examination system started in the Sui and Tang 
dynasties, it was largely restricted to the graduates of official schools 
already monopolized by elite lineages. From about the 8th century, the 
                                               
9  For an English language summary of the Naito thesis and its impact, see Miyakawa, 
1955.  
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civil service examination system evolved towards a three-tier (county, 
province and capital) nationwide system open to the majority of male 
commoners, well beyond the pupils of the official schools.  The opening-
up of the examination system and civil service recruitment restructured 
the traditional social classes based on the hereditary control of the 
aristocratic lineages over Confucian learning and provided an institutional 
basis for social mobility among the commoners. The incorporation of Neo-
Confucianism – a grand synthesis of Confucian learning expounded by 
Zhuxi (1130-1200) in the Song dynasty – into the Civil Service 
Examination solidified the Confucius school of thought as a state-
sanctioned ideology.    
By granting life-long privileges of tax exemption, and legal impunity 
of some degree, to varying levels of civil service examination candidates 
the system generated a class of non-hereditary elites, the so-called 
gentry.10  With the appointment of these candidates to bureaucratic posts 
based on a system of 3-5 year empire-wide rotation and the rule of 
avoidance, which precluded appointees from serving their home county, 
the empire created a class of career officials having no autonomous 
territorial or functional power base.11  With the use of a unified 
hieroglyphic written script that transcended regional dialects and the 
widespread diffusion of paper and block-printing during the Tang and 
Song dynasties the examination system became an imperial tool of 
cultural integration to forge a shared cultural identity  
Meanwhile, the fiscal system began a transition from the triple-tax 
system (租庸调) to the dual tax system (两税制) as proposed by 
Chancellor Yang Yan about 780.  The crux of the tax reform was to 
                                               
10 The gentry elites tended to reside locally and served the function of managing local 
affairs often in collaboration with the magistrates and governors. This layer of elites 
becomes an important intermediary between the masses and the state (Chang Chung-
li).   
11 Qian Mu 1966. Hou Ping-ti, 1967, pp.17-19 describes the limited extent of hereditary 
aristocracy in Ming and Qing China. 
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consolidate various forms of labour corves and contributions into direct 
taxation on land. The shift towards a land-based system of taxation 
enhanced the monetization of the fiscal regime, which then saw the 
adoption of standard monetary units of account such as copper cash, 
paper notes in the Song, and silver tael from the middle of the Ming.  
Monetization in the fiscal regime also made possible a central level 
budgeting system based on a fixed target of annual taxation (定额主义) 
and a system of cash reserves or savings as cushion for shocks (Ray 
Huang 1974, Iwai 2004).  These monetary and fiscal infrastructures made 
possible a new military recruitment system in the Song period based on a 
paid professional standing army (募兵制) to replace the peasant-soldier 
military recruitment regime (府兵制) or military commanderies (藩镇) often 
with an independent fiscal base founded on some form of tax-exempt 
land grant.   
A more profound consequence of fiscal restructuring was on the 
long-term impact of the Chinese property rights regime over man and 
land. Traditionally, in order to ensure state revenue, Chinese imperial 
rulers throughout the dynasties had actively engaged in the allocation of 
land to peasants who would in turn cultivate and contribute taxes.  The 
well-known equal-field system (均田制) as practiced in the Tang dynasty 
(618-907 AD) allocated land (授田) to male adults according to their 
productive capacity, upon which the state levied the so-called triple tax (
租庸调). Depending on the category of land title, some of the allocated 
land could be returned back to the state once the cultivator left or was 
deceased. But with the adoption of the dual tax system that shifted 
taxation onto land irrespective of its ownership status, the state began to 
relinquish control and regulation of property rights over land, leading to 
the de-facto recognition of private property rights and private land 
transactions which had only existed informally during earlier dynasties. 
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Hence, the de-jure imperial property rights in land and people began to 
transform into de-facto rights to taxation. Indeed, the Song became 
China‘s first dynasty with no explicit state policy on land allocation (Qian 
1966, chapter 2).  
The land-based dual-taxation system was to become the hall mark 
of Chinese fiscal regime all the way down to the 20th century, while the 
policy of fixed revenue targets was to become the cornerstone of the 
ideology of the rule of benevolence. They allowed the private sector 
rather than the state to capture or claim all the residuals of economic 
expansion brought about by rising productivity, growing territory and 
population under a system of a free-standing, family-based owner-cum-
tenant system of agricultural cultivation which itself owed its existence 
partly to the government‘s retreat from direct management or regulation 
of property rights in land. These transformations in fiscal policy and 
bureaucracy came to form what Wang Yanan claimed as the dual pillars 
of traditional Chinese polities, and are important in understanding the 
extensive growth from the Song dynasty onward (Wang 1981 chapter 8, 
Elvin, 1973, Seo 1999, Qian, chapter 2).   
This model of Chinese autocracy is founded on a ruler-centred 
model, with no formal or external institutional constraint placed against 
the powers of the Imperial rulers and their agents over the general 
populace except perhaps the vaguely defined "Mandate of Heaven" (天命
).12  There was a system of checks against bureaucratic abuses of power 
or dereliction of duty or to redress grievances of the general populace but 
only strictly within the administrative hierarchy in top-down fashion with 
                                               
12  The problem of the absence of formal constraints on the emperor is succinctly 
summarized by Ray Huang‘s study of Ming imperial system, the heyday of Chinese 
imperial despotism: ―…Final authority (was) rested in the sovereign, bureaucratic action 
was limited to remonstrance, resignation, attempted impeachment of those who carried 
out the emperor‘s orders, and exaggeration of portents as heaven-sent warnings to the 
wayward emperor. When all these failed, there was no recourse left.‖ See Ray Huang, 
1974, p. 7. 
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the emperor often being the final arbiter.  There is of course the so-called 
insurrection constraint: if pushed below subsistence by excessive imperial 
or bureaucratic abuses, masses might resort to violent rebellion to 
overthrow imperial power.  Indeed, rebellions and insurrection had been 
an enduring feature of Chinese history marked by periodic political 
fragmentation and dynastic strife. The well-known admonishment to the 
Tang Chinese emperor that that water can float as well as overturn a 
boat, just like masses do to their rulers, is a alternative characterization of 
the insurrection constraint.  
We can interpret the logic of traditional Chinese polity using Mancur 
Olson‘s benchmark framework based on the analogy of stationary and 
roving banditry.  The crux of his argument is that monopoly political rule 
given a long time horizon (especially with throne being hereditary across 
generations as in dynasties) is more likely to lead to a ―virtuous‖ 
equilibrium of relatively low level of predation or extraction and relatively 
high level of provision of public goods under a stationary bandit type of 
ruler.  The longer the time horizon, and the more stable the imperial rule,  
the more likely the ruler‘s interest could become, in Olsonian terms, 
―encompassing.‖ Hence, under conditions of monopoly rule, and a long 
time horizon and low discount rate, rulers‘ high valuation of the stream of 
future tax income over one-time or short term extraction constitutes a self-
enforcing constraint on the grabbing hands of the autocratic rulers in the 
absence of any formal constitutional constraint.13   
The remarkable coincidence between the Naito thesis on the 
―modern‖ features of Chinese absolutism and the Olsonian theory of 
autocracy had in fact been foretold by Chinese intellectuals themselves 
more than a millennium ago. The most well-known and enduring defence 
                                               
13 See Olson 1993. See Besley and Ghatak forthcoming for a simple reputation-based 
game-theoretic model that establishes a positive relationship between the ruler‘s rate 
expropriation and his political discount rate, leading to the rise of what they refer to as a 
case of endogenous property rights (private property rights protected without formal 
institutional commitment).        
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of centralized absolutism came from the renowned Tang scholar-
bureaucrat Liu Zongyuan (773-819). He argued that while a decentralized 
feudalism served the ―private‖ interest of the feudal rulers and their 
relatives, only a prefectural system under a centralized rule created a 
common public interest even though this creation itself was motivated by 
the private interest of the autocrat to strengthen his own power and 
subjugate his officials. According to Liu, the prefectural system contained 
gems of impartiality by allowing the worthy rather than the hereditary 
nobles to govern. One could easily replace a bad prefect or magistrate 
but not a bad feudal lord. Hence for Liu, the founding of the Qin marked 
the birth of a ―public under the heaven‖ (公天下) in China. Indeed, he 
went on to point out that the prefectural system out-performed 
feudalism by what may be termed ―the insurrection test‖: history shows 
that rebels against crown had come from the masses, the 
principalities, or the commanderies but none from the officials and 
prefectures (Yang 1969, pp. 7-8, Feng 2006, pp.60-63).  In the next 
section, we test how this Chinese model of autocracy fared by way of 
Liu‘s ―insurrection test‖.  
 
 
II.  The Test of History  
Imperial Unity and Dynastic Longevity 
As argued by China historian Ge Jianxiong, the two millennia of 
Chinese history since the founding of the Qin dynasty had actually seen 
more years of political fragmentation than unification under one ruler. 
Using the geographic size of unified Ming China as the criteria (shown as 
the shaded area in the map, sometimes also referred to as China proper, 
the largely agrarian part of China), Ge‘s calculation, as summarized in 
Appendix Table, reveals that out of the 2135 years since Qin, China was 
unified for only about 935 years.  Meanwhile, warfare is a constant theme 
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running through the Chinese dynasties, fragmented or unified.  Calculated 
from a detailed recording of incidences of warfare compiled by China‘s 
Military History Committee, Appendix Table shows a total of 3752 
incidences of warfare in the span of 2686 years, giving an average of 1.4 
incidences of warfare per year throughout the period.  
Figure 1 plots two reconstructed indices of Chinese unification 
against the incidences of warfare within each century between 7th century 
BC and 19th century AD.  For each century, the two indices of unification 
are the sum of the product of two items denoted as Ni and Ti, written as 


100
0T
NiTi  with the subscript i denoting the ith century between 4
th BC and 
19th century. In our first index, the Ge Jianxiong index (indicated by the 
light-shaded column figure 1), Ni takes a value of 1 if China (again 
defined by the Ming territory) was under one ruler and zero if not, while Ti 
is set equal to the number of years when the value of Ni is equal to one 
for that ith century.  So this index is a graphic reproduction of Ge‘s 
historical narrative of Chinese unification and fragmentation by centuries 
shown in Appendix Table.  For the second, or weighted index of 
unification (plotted in dark shade column in figure 1), Ni is now set equal 
to the inverse of the number of polities ruling over the Chinese territory 
while Ti is equal to the number of years those polities were ruling over 
China within that ith century. As distinguished from the Ge index where Ni 
is simply a binary variable of one (one ruler only) or zero (more than one 
ruler), the weighted index captures the degree of Chinese unification by 
taking into account the number of polities ruling over China and hence 
tells a richer story of Chinese empire formation 
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Chinese territory under Ming and Qing 
 
Notes: The area in shade roughly corresponds to territories under Qin and Ming or the 
so-called China Proper. I want to thank Ma Fengyan, Yan Xun and Helena Ivins for 
assistance with this map.  
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Figure 1. Number of Recorded Warfare and Number of Years China was 
Unified per each Century 
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Sources: for the Ge Jianxiong index, see explanation in Appendix Table and text. 
For the weighted index, the number of political entities are calculated as follows:  
Number of entities are set equal to 7 in the Warring states period (-4th century), 3 in the 
Three Kingdoms Period (220-265), 2 in the Western Jin period, 7 in the Eastern Jin, 6 
in the Southern and Northern dynasties, 5 in the Five dynasties and ten kingdoms, 2 in 
the Northern and Southern Song period. For periods of dynastic breakdown but a 
unitary dynastic rule continued to exist in name, I assign the number of entities all 
equal to 2.  For the number of territories and dynastic governments, we consulted the 
China Historical Atlas (8 vols.) edited by Tan Qixiang and Annals of East Asia by 
Fujishima and Nogami.  
 
Both indices in the figure show that the drive for unification 
proceeded in roughly three phases, beginning with the rise of the Qin and 
Han dynasties between 3rd BC and 3rd AD, then the surge of Sui and 
Tang dynasties between 6th and 8th century and the final consolidation 
towards a single unitary empire under the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties 
starting with the 13th century.  Fragmentation was most prolonged 
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between the 3rd and 6th centuries – what Naito referred to as China‘s age 
of aristocracy - when competing polities or dynasties, often with shifting 
territories and transient tenures, jostled for geo-political power. 
Fragmentation re-emerged following the collapse of the Tang in 907. But 
with the founding of the Northern Song in 960 up until the Mongol 
conquest in 1280 political fragmentation in China proper took the form of 
sustained rivalry usually between two large political entities pitting 
Northern and Southern Song against the non-Han rulers of Liao, Jin and 
later Mongol consecutively. Hence, our second index, more than the Ge 
Jiangxiong index, reflects a trend of progressive consolidation of Chinese 
states towards a single unitary rule from the tenth century (or Song) 
onward with periods of disintegration becoming shorter and the number of 
competing states smaller but their sizes larger.   
Figure 1 also links the unification indices with data on the 
incidences of warfare. While warfare persisted throughout the history, the 
centuries of important dynastic change (marked with circles in figure 1) in 
3rd BC, 6th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 14th and 17th AD (corresponding to the Qin and 
Han, Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing respectively) generally 
corresponded to a upsurge of incidences of warfare, usually followed by a 
moderation of warfare in the following century as the new dynasties 
managed to consolidate their hold on power. 14 
A major sustained threat to Chinese unification came from the 
repeated nomadic incursions originating in the northern frontier outside 
                                               
14 Clearly, one needs to exercise caution on the interpretation of the warfare data culled 
from the two volume work compiled by China‘s Military History Committee. According 
to the brief introductory notes, the two volume works are largely based on the laborious 
team project that compiled incidences of warfare mostly from the twenty four historical 
annals with some additional sources. Although brief narrative was provided for each 
incidence of warfare recorded, the records do not capture the scale, duration or 
intensity of each incidence of warfare. Nonetheless, we believe it is very useful 
information to give broad quantitative indication of the historical narrative or at least the 
official or prevailing perceptions of the magnitude of warfare in Chinese history. Bai and 
Kung‘s paper did a convincing cross-check the validity of this data source an 
independent work by Peter Perdue for the Qing dynasty (1644-1911).    
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China‘s Great Wall where the Chinese system of governance based on 
sedentary agriculture halted before the steppes and dry-lands.15 Figure 2 
reveals the relative importance of the nomadic conflicts with Han Chinese 
as a share of total warfare incidents throughout Chinese history.  Indeed, 
except for the earlier period of Chinese empire in the 2nd and 1st century 
BC, the number of conflicts between nomads and sedentary Chinese 
always exceeded the internal rebellions within China, marked by a sharp 
surge from the 9th century afterward.  The importance of Han-nomadic 
conflict has been long noted (Lattimore 1989, Turchin 2009, Bai and Kung 
forthcoming).  Despite being fewer in number, the nomadic population 
derived a comparative advantage in violence from mobility of settlements 
and the availability of horses. Peter Turchin noted that all but one of the 
fifteen unifications that occurred in Chinese history – the establishment of 
the Ming c. 1368 – originated in the North and almost all the Chinese 
capitals were located in the north even after the economic centre shifted 
south to the Yangzi valley after the first millennium (p. 192). Indeed, 
China‘s northern frontier demarcated by the Great Wall witnessed a 
progressive escalation in the scale of warfare and the size of political 
units mobilized for warfare between the Han-Chinese and nomadic 
Chinese.  The massive construction of the Grand Canal in the 7th century, 
for example, provided the logistic capacity to escalate the military build-up 
along China‘s northern frontier by feeding on grain shipped from the 
economically ever-important South, but this was successively matched by 
the scaling-up of imperial confederations of semi-nomadic tribes such as 
Xiongnu, Turks and Mongols (See Quan Hanshen 1976 for the role of 
Grand Canal). 
 
 
                                               
15 For the classification of non-Han Chinese regions in Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang 
and Tibet, see Owen Lattimore 1940.  
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Figure 2. Incidences of Warfare fought between Nomads and Han 
Chinese per Century as a share of Total Warfare (in percent) 
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Source and notes: same as Figure 1. Number of warfare between Han Chinese and 
nomads are calculated by Bai and Kung, forthcoming. I express my special thanks to 
Bai and Kung for sharing their datasets on nomadic-Chinese Warfare.  
 
Charles Tilly‘s pithy account of ―how war made states, and vice 
versa‖ for Medieval and early modern Europe turns out to be an equally 
apt depiction of the rise of Chinese empire. The striking degree of 
synchrony and feedback loops between the rise of the steppe's imperial 
confederations and the Chinese empire in driving up the size of both wars 
and those states engaged in it produces a Chinese prequel to Tilly‘s tale 
of war and state formation in Europe, but on a scale much larger and a 
time frame much earlier. Tracing the number of political entities in the 
Latin West and the Muslim World on a century-by-century basis for a 
millennium, Bosker, Buringh and van Zanden (2008) show that they 
proliferated to as many as several hundred and 20 respectively during the 
14th century, and both only started to consolidate from the 15th century 
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onward – almost five centuries later than the Chinese empire (see figure 
3 in Bosker et al). Indeed, measured by the standard of imperial unity and 
dynastic longevity – not to mention the scale – the performance of the 
Chinese model of political absolutism remained unparalleled among 
major world civilizations. Liu Zongyuan‘s insight on the merits of 
centralized absolutism turned out to be remarkably prescient even on a 
global scale.  
 
The Case of Qing: 1644-1911 
China‘s last dynasty – the Qing – epitomizes a condensed history 
of empire-building from rebellion, warfare to taxation and political and 
administrative centralization. The Qing Imperial monarchy was Manchu, a 
non-Han Chinese minority from China‘s Northeast frontier that became a 
great defender of orthodox Confucius ideology and a centralized political 
system. The more than two and half centuries under the Qing saw 
roughly a tripling of the population and a doubling of territory, ushering in 
China‘s prosperous 18th century, the so-called ―Glorious World of Kangxi 
and Qianlong‖ (康乾盛世).  
 The road to the heyday of the 18th century prosperity started in 
1644, the year of the Qing‘s official inauguration. As a non-Han minority 
ruler of China, Qing‘s earlier reliance on Chinese generals and military 
force to suppress the former Ming loyalists led to the build-up relatively 
autonomous power bases and political structures in Sothern China and 
hence the created real institutional possibilities for feudalization or 
decentralization. This, however, was to end by 1683 when Emperor 
Kangxi (1661-1722) quashed the rebellion of these so-called ―three 
feudatories‖ and annexed their territories into Qing‘s centralized 
administration.  Two years later, Kangxi broke the resistance of the 
rebellious naval kingdom of Zheng Chenggong and officially integrated 
the island of Taiwan into the administrative unit of China.  In the final 
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decades of the 17th century, the Qing contained the threat from an 
expansionary Russia by signing the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, and 
conquered China‘s North-western territory in 1696.  From 1720, the Qing 
attained the control of Tibet with the installation of a new Dalai Lama. 
Clearly, by the early 18th century, the Qing had succeeded in the 
consolidation of power and establishment of monopoly rule over 
historically China‘s largest ever territory, with further extension of 
suzerainty across much of East and Southeast Asia through the so-called 
tributary order.16   
 
Figure 3. Government Expenditure (Revenue) in Qing China 
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Source Notes: Fiscal data from Iwai, Table 2, p.37. Hamashita p. 73. Lower Yangzi 
grain price from Wang Yeh-chien 1991 is used to deflate the nominal series.   
 
To establish the relationship between imperial fiscal revenue and 
political stability, we start with Qing‘s official figure, which understandably 
                                               
16 See Jonathan Spence 1990 for a standard narrative.   
23 
 
could not reflect the full extent of governmental taxation on the whole 
economy. Figure 3 plots series of expenditure (revenue) under the direct 
control of the Board of Finance. It clearly shows the working of a fixed 
target for revenue for the period between 1662 and 1849: the series 
remained largely trendless with an average of about 36 million silver taels 
but a standard deviation of only 3.2.  The series began to rise from the 
mid-19th century but in real terms still remained mostly stationary once 
deflated by the price of rice. Indeed fiscal revenue in real terms actually 
declined between the late-17th century and the mid-19th century. 
It is important to note that only a portion – usually a third - of this 
revenue arrived at the coffers of the Board of Revenue, as much of it was 
expended as direct transfers between provinces or expenses incurred 
outside Beijing. A better gauge of Imperial Qing‘s fiscal position is better 
reflected in the annual inflows and outflows of silver and the changes in 
stocks of silver reserves stored at the coffers of the Board of Finance, 
whose accounts, fortunately, have largely survived. Figure 4 shows the 
available series of annual inflows and outflows of silver at the coffers of 
the Board of Finance, which, at an average rate of about 11 million taels 
amounted to less than a third of the total annual tax revenue. Although 
trendless, there are great fluctuations, with sharp rises in outflows often 
associated with major warfare expenditure. As the balance of inflows and 
outflows determines the existing stock of silver reserves at the treasury 
coffers, the occasional jump in the annual revenue after the turn of the 
nineteenth century (in particular the years 1804, 1827 and 1834) reveals 
sometimes desperate measures (such as the sale of government offices) 
to replenish the Qing‘s silver stocks in order to remedy its deteriorating 
fiscal position.  
Figure 5 plots silver reserves against incidences of warfare, and 
conveys a fuller and more telling portrayal of the Qing‘s fiscal position in 
its two and half centuries of rule. In its early years of military conquest in 
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the 1660s the Qing‘s silver reserves started out as minimal but then 
gradually built up during the 18th century, particularly when the number of 
war incidences sharply reduced and political stability set in. Indeed, at the 
time of the famous declaration by K'ang-xi emperor in 1712 that there will 
be no additional taxes on newly added taxable population (续生人丁,永不
加赋) and Yongzhen‘s follow-up fiscal reform further consolidating head 
tax into land tax (摊丁入地) in 1722, Qing entered into a prolonged phase 
of accumulation in silver reserves peaking at over 70 million by the 1790s, 
roughly equivalent to two years of total tax revenue. It was also during 
these glorious decades of K'ang-xi and Qianlong that numerous tax 
exemptions were granted in times of bad harvest as further hallmarks of 
the Imperial rule of benevolence (Zhang Zhidong, pp. 19-21). The 
suppression of the White Lotus rebellion around the turn of the eighteenth 
century at the end of the Qianlong rule led to a sharp drop in silver 
reserves from which the Qing never fully recovered.  The 1840s Opium 
War followed by the devastating Taiping rebellion almost completely 
drained the Board‘s coffers of its silver reserves, and left the Qing largely 
bankrupt by the mid-19th century.  
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Figure 4. Annual Inflows and Outflows of Silver Reserves at the Qing 
Board of Revenue (in ten thousand taels) 
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Sources: Shi zhihong pp. 272-281. Sales of office revenue data from Luo Yudong, pp. 
6-7. 
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Figure 5. Annual Average of Recorded Incidences of Warfare and Silver 
Reserves (in ten thousand taels) in Qing (1644-1911) 
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Source notes: China‘s Military History Editorial Committee (ed.), A Chronology of 
Warfare in Dynastic China (Zhongguo Lidai Zhanzheng Nianbiao). Silver Reserves 
from Shi zhihong pp. 272-281.  
 
A careful study by Wang Yeh-chien on the structure of fiscal 
revenues based on a couple of benchmark years confirms the 
predominance of land tax. For 1776, 70% of total revenue was derived 
from land tax with the remainder coming from some form of commercial 
taxes. Only about 22% was collected in kind (Wang 1973, p. 80). On the 
expenditure side, about 50% was expended on direct payment to soldiers 
and another 17% used to pay for the salaries of officials and bureaucrats. 
Expenditure on public goods such as maintenance of river transport or 
famine relief seemed to be only slightly above 10%.17   
Overall, it is possible that Qing tax rates in the 18th century were the 
lowest across all dynasties in per capita terms. The study by Liu Guanglin 
                                               
17 See Shi Zhihong, p. 68. Iwai, p. 32. Although the Imperial court or the so-called Nei-
wu-fu (内务府) took in a mere 1% of the total budget, it had its own source of revenue 
and expenditure outside the official balance sheet of the board of revenue, see Chang 
te-ch‘ang. 
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seems to indicate that per capita tax burdens around 1776 were the 
lowest across several benchmarks periods since the Song dynasty. It is 
likely that the size of the Qing standing army around the 18th century, at 
about eight hundred thousand, was lower in absolute number than both 
those in the Ming and Song despite the enormous population increase 
(Iwai, p. 33). Even K'ang-xi himself gloated that ―in our Dynasty, the total 
sum of military and civil expenses is about the same as that of the Ming 
period. But speaking of the Court expenses, the aggregate amount spent 
by the Court is even less than that for one palace of the Imperial 
Concubines. The accumulated sum of the past 36 years is less than that 
spent in one year's time during the Ming.‖ (cited in Chang te-ch‘ang, p. 
271). 
Thanks to recent comparative work, we are now able to place the 
Qing imperial revenue and fiscal regime in a global context, as shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows that the total nominal Chinese 
governmental revenue in silver terms was higher than any of the 
European states or Ottoman empire in the latter half of the seventeenth 
century, and remained one of the largest throughout the eighteenth 
century. This is largely a reflection of China‘s enormous population size, 
roughly ten times that of the Ottoman Empire, Russia or France 
individually during the 18th century. In per capita terms, Chinese tax 
revenue as revealed in Table 2 ranked with Ottoman and Russian rates 
as among the lowest while England and the Dutch stood at the other end, 
with France and Spain in between. The starkest contrast came in the first 
half of the nineteenth century roughly at a time China confronted England 
head-on in the Opium War. Qing‘s total central revenue amounted to only 
24% of that of Britain and in per capita terms, was a striking 1%. 
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Table 1. Qing Central Government Revenue in International Comparison 
(Tons of Silver) 
 China Ottoman Russia France Spain England Dutch R 
1650-99 940 248  851 243 239  
1700-49 1304 294 155 932 312 632 310 
1750-99 1229 263 492 1612 618 1370 350 
1800-49 1367     6156  
1850-99 2651     10941  
Source: China same as figure 3. Other countries are from Karaman and Pamuk 2010, 
available at http://:www.ata.boun.edu.tr/sevketpamuk/JEH2010articledatabase. I want 
to thank Kivanc Karaman and Sevket Pamuk for sharing their revenue data sets.    
Conversion notes: one Chinese silver tael = 37 grams of silver.  
 
Table 2. International Comparison of per capita Tax Revenue  
Per Capita Revenue in grams of Silver 
 China Ottoman Russia France Spain England Dutch R 
1650-99 7.0 11.8  46.0 35.8 45.1  
1700-49 7.2 15.5 6.4 46.6 41.6 93.5 161.0 
1750-99 4.2 12.9 21.0 66.4 63.1 158.4 170.7 
1800-49 3.4     303.8  
1850-99 7.0     344.1  
Per Capita Revenue in days of urban unskilled wages 
 China Ottoman Russia France Spain England Dutch R 
1650-99  1.7  8.0 7.7 4.2 13.6 
1700-49 2.26 2.6 6.4 6.7 4.6 8.9 24.1 
1750-99 1.32 2.0 8.3 11.4 10.0 12.6 22.8 
1800-49 1.23     17.2  
1850-99 1.99     19.4  
 
Source: same as Table 1.  
For per capita revenue in days of urban unskilled wages, 1650-59, 1700-09 figures are 
used to represent 1650-99, 1700-49 respectively. Average of 1750-50 and 1780-89 are 
used to represent 1750-99 for all other countries except China. See 
http://:www.ata.boun.edu.tr/sevketpamuk/JEH2010articledatabase. Nominal wages for 
China and England are for Beijing and London drawn from Allen et al 2011. Nominal wages 
for Russia are 1 and 2.52 grams of silver for 1700-1725 and 1772-1774 respectively from 
data supplied by Brois Mironov listed on 
http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/files/Wages_Moscow_1613-1871.xls. My thanks go to Peter Lindert 
and Steve Nafziger for the Russian data.  
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The second panel of Table 2 follows the approach of Karaman and 
Pamuk to convert per capita tax revenue into daily wages of urban 
unskilled laborers. Qing‘s imperial revenue in per capita terms amounted 
to only just over two days‘ earnings of an urban unskilled worker in the 
early 18th century, and dropped further by the late 18th century, reflecting 
the combined effected of a fixed revenue target accompanied by an 
explosive population expansion. In terms of daily wages, the lower wage 
level made the Chinese per capita fiscal revenue about 10% of the British 
level as compared to only about 1% in silver terms for the first half of the 
nineteenth century.   
The contrast is equally striking when it comes to the trends and 
structure of taxation. While Qing imperial revenue remained largely 
stagnant (and even declined slightly in real terms), the absolute amount 
collected rose in Britain by a stunning 17 fold from 1665 to 1815.  Total 
British revenue as a share of national income, before the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 only slightly more than 3%, surged to about 18% by 
1810 (O‘Brien 1988, p. 3). While firm GDP estimates for China in the 18 
and 19th centuries are unavailable, some tentative calculations by Wang 
Yeh-chien show that his more comprehensive version of tax revenues 
(which includes guess-estimates for the costs of tax collection as well as 
various extralegal local surcharges) amounted to a mere 2.4% of NNP 
even in the 1910s.18 In sum, if the Chinese empire outperformed other 
political regimes by the measure of imperial unity and dynastic stability, 
the Qing record in terms of low tax extraction at the Central level was also 
remarkably impressive in the early modern world. Hence the cause of 
divergence between early modern China and Europe needs to be sought 
beyond the measures of dynastic tenure and fiscal extraction. 
                                               
18  See Wang 1973, p. 133. Wang‘s result also seems broadly consistent with the daily 
wage conversion in Table 3.  The surge in British tax receipts came disproportionately 
from indirect taxes such as customs and excise duties, which accounted for nearly 80% 
of total revenue towards the end of the 18th century. See O‘Brien 1988, pp. 9-10. 
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III.  The Great Divergence  
Incentives and Information in the Chinese State 
The Olsonian equilibrium of a virtuous autocracy assumed away 
the principle-agent problem within the regime, an assumption, 
interestingly, is consistent with the idealized Confucian construct of the 
state as a paternalistic extension of a patriarchal family where the 
incentives and interests of family members are confluent by default.  
Given the expansion of the empire and impersonal nature of imperial 
bureaucracy, the reality is often far from this ideal: the incentive schemes 
and information structures of the three actors – the emperor, the 
bureaucrat/gentry and the masses or peasant farmers – were more likely 
to diverge, giving rise to potential double principal-agent problems. 
Indeed, the system of centralized administrative rule whose merits so 
lauded by Tang scholars such as Han Yu and Liu Zongyuan may have 
merely replaced the problem of conflict and concession among feudal 
power magnates by a set of principal-agent problems within a centralized 
hierarchy, which tended to increase with the rising scale of the empire 
given the pre-modern monitoring technology.19  The continuous co-
optation of heterogeneous or alien political units into the centralized 
administrative hierarchy (through force or other means) became a 
historical trade-off between external threat and internal insurrection.20   
The agency problem of the regime became most apparent if we 
look beyond the imperial capital. The fear of any potential build-up of an 
alternative autonomous local power base resulted in a highly centralized 
fiscal system during the Ming and Qing with almost no officially 
                                               
19  See Sng Tuanhwee 2010 for a model on informational diseconomies of scale in 
Chinese empire. 
20 In this light, the Tang-Song transformation – the homogenisation of the vast empire 
through the institution of a standardized bureaucratic recruitment system, the rise of a 
relatively dispersed but homogeneous small-holding peasantry and the widespread 
diffusion of Confucian ideology – can be viewed as institutional innovation to alleviate 
the incentive and agency problem in a growing empire. 
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recognizable local finance.  The centre issued detailed rules and 
regulations on each item of revenue and expenditure for the county level, 
where taxes had to be collected from the highly dispersed and 
decentralized producing or marketing units across a giant empire and 
remitted. The Qing government distinguished between remitted taxes (起
运) and retained ones (存留) with the latter often recognized as the local 
cost of tax-collection, forming the local administrative budget.  But as 
Madeleine Zelin (p. 28) shows, retained revenues were only about 21.5% 
of total revenue in 1685.  Even among this 21.5%, the bulk of it was 
expended on local expenses connected with the center, such as the 
provision for imperial armies and imperial relay stations.   
As the official tax revenue allocated to the local administration fell 
far short of the requirements of normal administration – often insufficient 
to cover the salaries of official bureaucrats let alone their expenses and 
support staffs such as secretaries, clerks, runners and personal servants 
–  various levels of bureaucrats relied on informal or the infamous 
extralegal surcharges (苛捐杂税) beyond the official level.  Zelin‘s study 
documents in detail the sources of these revenues ranging from the 
levying of various surcharges, manipulation of weights and measures and 
currency conversion in tax collection, falsifying reports, shifting funds 
across fiscal seasons or years, retaining commercial tax revenue, 
hoarding tax revenue from newly claimed land and exacting contributions 
and donations from local farmers or merchants. Provincial level officials 
and their ―unofficial‖ staffs relied on the extraction of gifts and 
contributions from the lower level officials and engaged in practises such 
as skimming funds in purchases and allocations (buying at a low price but 
reporting a high price).21  
                                               
21 See Zelin, pp.46-71. Official collusion could also backfire in unexpected directions. 
Often, the extralegal nature of these surcharges forced the parties involved to pay off 
blackmail, see Iwai, p.3-4. 
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Reliance on informal local taxation and the employment of unofficial 
staffs for public administration often led to the privatization of public 
services.  Ch‘u Tung-tsu‘s classic book on Qing local government offers a 
vivid portrayal of county clerks extracting bribes with the threat of delaying 
legal cases submitted, runners demanding so-called ―chain-release 
money‖ from the families of the accused criminals who would otherwise 
have been put under chain and torture, retaining part of the ―recovered 
goods‖ from theft or robbery, or sometimes resorting to outright extortion 
of wealthy residents with false accusations. Even the porters guiding the 
magistrate‘s office would demand pay for handing in documents or 
warrants.  All in all, clerks, runners and personal servants often 
collaborated in sharing the spoils of corruption. This nexus of corruption 
at the local level is a pale reflection of the much larger networks of 
collusion at higher levels of the state machinery. Although levels of 
extraction were hierarchical from the provincial level down, deceit and 
collaboration were mutual across levels, creating layers of cover-ups 
among the officials and staffs that would frustrate any monitoring 
attempts.22  One seminal study by Chang Chung-li on Chinese gentry 
income put non-official income extracted from below (that is excluding 
income earned through business or other activities) by different levels of 
officials at a whopping 19 times of official income.23 The prevalence of 
these abuses at various levels of the government helps explain the 
apparent contradiction of the very low rate of tax extraction measured by 
                                               
22  It is often known that sometimes staffs kept duplicate set of account books, with the 
set for local use marked by secret codes impenetrable from the official examination.  
These special types of account books even circulated informally within a fairly wide 
area. See Zelin p.240. 
23 We can link these unofficial income estimates with total tax revenue. The total 
unofficial income for officials below the province were, according to Zhang, stood at 63 
million tales which were 81% of the total official tax quota around 1884 (Chang 1962, 
chapter 1).  This seems to point to the validity of the estimate by Wang Yeh-chien 
(1973) that roughly doubled the official tax quota to include the entire tax revenue for 
1753 (Wang, p. 72).  
 
33 
 
the receipts of the Board of Revenue and the rapacious image of Ming 
and Qing regimes.  
Incentive misalignment between ruler and his agents explains the 
historical drift between informal and formal bureaucracy. As observed by 
many historians, most formal bureaucratic posts started out as personal 
appointments from within the imperial court in a process of internal 
staffers being sent as imperial plenipotentiaries to control the outer layers 
of administration – indeed, the post of provincial governorship started out 
as imperial plenipotentiary sent to oversee local bureaucrats. Once these 
posts were absorbed into the bureaucratic structure permanently 
stationed outside the imperial capital, new layers of inner court personnel 
were then sent to monitor and control them, leading to a process of what 
many historians referred as ―externalization‖ of inner staff. (Qian Mu p.44, 
Liang Qicao, p.28, Wang Yannan pp. 48-49).  An extreme version of this 
problem can be seen the anomalous history of eunuchs as a distinct 
political class throughout Chinese dynasties. With a low formal status and 
no heir to pose a potential challenge to the imperial throne but abundant 
access to the emperor‘s inner court, the eunuchs often wielded enormous 
power in the name of the emperor; and at times took de-facto control of 
the throne, often in connivance with the courtesans. Despite being 
warned against throughout history, the threat of the eunuchs to formal 
imperial rule and governance never went away (Yu, Qinhua 2006).  
In the heyday of Ming and Qing Chinese absolutism, the ire of 
another generation of Chinese intellectuals had by then turned to the 
faults of centralized absolutism. Writing in the 17th century, independent 
scholars such as Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu lamented that the 
emperors and public officials had too often subsumed the public interest 
to their own private interest. Gu in particular reminisced about the 
advantages of decentralization under feudalism in China‘s antiquity, 
where the right of veto acted as some form of constraint against imperial 
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power and the autonomous princes or lords were more caring of their 
constituents than the rotating bureaucrats (Xiao, pp.404-411).  
The faults of Chinese absolutism are best summarized by Liang 
Qicao, one of modern China‘s most celebrated intellectuals and 
reformers. Writing in 1896 at a time of ideological crisis in the face of 
Western imperial challenge, Liang summed up the weakness of the 
traditional Chinese system as rooted in distrust. As rulers cannot trust 
their officials, they set up multiple layers of bureaucracies to check up on 
each other. In the end, nothing gets accomplished as no one takes 
responsibility for anything. Moreover, the lower level officials were more 
interested in pleasing their superiors than serving their people. By taking 
wealth from the people to bribe their superiors, their posts became more 
secure even though their constituents were mistreated. In China‘s age of 
antiquity, local officials were appointed from the local people. But imperial 
distrust led to the rotation of officials and by Ming times they were rotated 
across North and South with appointees incurring debts and travelling 
thousands of miles to take up their posts. Not understanding local dialects 
and customs, their posts became a mere facade with real power vested in 
entrenched clerks and runners. By the time they learned they could 
accomplish a thing or two, their tenure there was up and they would be on 
the move again. Separated by multiple layers of bureaucracies and living 
deep inside the court throng with eunuchs and courtesans, the emperor 
hardly knew of events outside.  Hence, a regime, as Liang concludes, that 
did everything to guard itself against itself was also self-weakening 
(pp.27-31).    
 
The Great Divergence: an Institutional Interpretation  
From the theoretical perspective of incentive and information, we 
can reinterpret imperial China‘s long standing policy of a fixed target for 
tax revenue, the hall mark of ―imperial rule of benevolence‖, as a rational 
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strategy to cope with information asymmetry. In the absence of 
information or monitoring capacity, the principal (equivalent to a landlord 
in a standard principal agent model in the agrarian setting) would opt for a 
fixed rent contract with his agent over that of share and wage.24 Indeed, 
one can observe the practise of fixed revenue quota – akin to some form 
of tax-farming – being extended to other spheres of taxation such as 
commercial and urban taxes, or even local governance, throughout 
imperial China. In fact, the attempts to establish a formal bureaucracy and 
a transparent taxation system where the state could claim the residuals or 
at least a share of the total revenue faced fundamental difficulties. 
Formalizing local informal taxation, as attempted in the well-studied 18th 
century Yongzheng fiscal reform, exposed previously hidden revenue to 
possible extraction from the upper level officials or even the imperial 
throne itself especially in times of distress. 25 Often, when pressed by 
financial exigencies, Ming and Qing rulers displayed few qualms about ad 
hoc extractions through the administrative hierarchy, the sale of official 
titles, forced contribution, outright confiscation or – as in the devastating 
mid-19th century Taiping rebellion – massive monetary debasement.26  
The irony here is that informal or extralegal taxation - being outside the 
official purview - became the most secure source of local finance.  
                                               
24  See Eugene White for a similar theoretical approach on the French taxation system 
in the Ancien Regime.  
25 The well-known fiscal reforms carried out by the Yongzheng emperor from 1724 
increased surcharges to land taxes and essentially legitimized previously ―illegal‖ local 
extractions. While achieving some degree of success, the policy had to be largely 
abandoned towards the end of the 18th century as it could not solve the dual problems 
of the inability of the higher administration to monitor the use of local revenue and the 
tendency for upper level bureaucracy to engage in extraction and re-allocation of 
revenue designed for local use, see Zelin, chapter 7. 
26 Even China‘s highest authority of imperial revenue had difficulty in refusing extraction 
from the emperors.  In a memorial sent by the Board of Revenue to the Emperor in 
1872, the minister stated: ―A line must be drawn between the Nei-wu-fu (the Imperial 
Household) and the government Treasury which has been established by our early 
ancestors… The revenue of this Board is fixed, but the borrowing of the Nei-wu-fu is 
indefinite. During these recent years, ….We request your majesty to instruct the Nei-
wu-fu to observe faithfully the tradition:… so that unnecessary expenses can be 
curtailed and national revenue can be preserved…". (Chang, p. 269). 
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This fundamental contradiction is rooted in the conflict of interest 
embedded in an institutional framework where the emperor or the upper 
level officials took on the dual role of both the principal and the contract-
enforcer in this principal-agent contract.  The discretionary power of the 
emperor and bureaucracy as derived from this dual role may have served 
the objective of political and social control so indispensable that the rulers 
were willing to acquiesce to local corruption and abuses (as long as they 
were within the threshold of political stability and dynastic survival). 
Where such abuses became or were beginning to be viewed as 
excessive, the rulers would clamp down selectively (given their power of 
discretion) with the severity of punishments often varying not just with the 
nature of offense but also with the disciplinary needs of the time.27  
One can see a stable and predicable rule of law difficult to emerge 
in a system with high component of discretionary power.  With access to 
these power and its associated rents restricted to the bureaucratic or 
political-social hierarchy, the incentive structure in the empire heavily 
favoured political or bureaucratic interest over any independent economic 
or commercial interest.  The often hidden and decentralized nature of 
these rents in the form of informal or extra-legal taxation (or corruption) at 
the local level (acquiesced to the extent that they did not directly threaten 
imperial stability) could also impose disproportionately high cost on 
relatively capital and scale intensive activities most vulnerable to 
information exposure. Likewise, information hoarding (of wealth or 
investment) that tied government‘s grabbing hand could bind its ―helping 
hand‖, leading to what Greif referred to as a case of ―absent government‖ 
(Greif 2005). Indeed, many of Qing‘s main intervention in the private 
sector such as tax exemption and famine relief all seemed to target risk 
                                               
27 For periodic and selective capital punishment on the so-called ―economic crime 
―meted out to high level government officials see He Ping, pp.293-5. Huang counted in 
detail the sorry fate of all the 89 most ministers of Revenue under the Ming from 1380, 
pp.13-14. The variation of imperial monitoring and punishment across dynasties and 
imperial reigns may also partly account the life-cycle of Chinese dynasties. 
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reduction and social stability.  But Qing‘s role in commercial legislation or 
state enforcement of contracts was comparative deficient.28 This is not 
surprising given that the relatively unchanged size of the Qing imperial 
household (which could thus cap the size of rulers‘ expenditure needs for 
luxury consumption) and its overriding concern with dynastic tenure rather 
than revenue maximization.  
Although we see a similar linkage between warfare driven resource 
mobilization and state-building and consolidation in Western Europe, two 
institutional features – jurisdictional fragmentation and representation 
institution of some sort (or ―parliament‖ broadly defined) – stood apart 
from China.29 In city-states or federations of city-states (such as Northern 
Italy and Holland) with strong representation of commercial or property 
interests, warfare mobilization led to the rise of what Charles Tilly referred 
to as the capital-intensive path as contrasted with the coercion-intensive 
path followed by larger empires such as the Russian and Ottoman where 
the interest of the commercial elites were subdued and representative 
institutions were weak or non-existent. In the capital-intensive path, war 
mobilization accelerated the development of financial and fiscal 
institutions marked by the rise of public debt and commercial taxation.30 
One could surmise that representative institution could be one 
mechanism that helped resolve incentives and principal-agent problem by 
allowing economic and commercial interest direct control of economic 
rents reaped from the (military or commercial) success of European inter-
state competition.31  
                                               
28 See Ma 2010 for lagged development in the Chinese legal sphere in commercial and 
financial sectors. 
29 See Grief 2006 for the ―corporate‖ nature of Western institution and van Zanden, 
Buringh and Bosker 2010 for the rise of parliament. 
30 See North and Weingast (1989) for the case of Glorious Revolution in England and 
Brewer (pp.66-67) for the rise of modern civil bureaucracy in post-Glorious Revolution 
England. Also see Karaman and Pamuk 2010, Dincecco 2009. 
31 See Khan 2000 for an exposition of the so-called Schumpeterian rents in states and 
government policy.  There are large differences in the nature of states within Europe 
and at different times. Mokyo and Nye (2007) make the point that the peculiarly 
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Hence, as intimated by Max Weber, marked by the joint absence of 
political representation and inter-state competition, military warfare in 
imperial China may not induce direct forward linkage to state capacity in 
financial and fiscal administration (Weber 1951, pp. 103-4). The absolutist 
nature of Chinese imperial power, which could and had made numerous 
state conversions of ―private loans‖ into forced contributions throughout 
history, may have deterred the rise of a viable market for sustainable 
public debt. Moreover, China‘s imperial monopoly over the entire Chinese 
territory under a single jurisdiction also precluded the independent 
existence of any financial market or institution that could wield 
extraterritorial or multi-jurisdictional power to discipline or punish 
absolutist rulers in case of sovereign default – an institutional device 
operated in Europe marked by political fragmented and multiple 
jurisdictions.32   
Hence, the Chinese case provides another affirmation of the 
paradoxical pattern long recognized in European fiscal regimes: that 
constitutionally constrained regimes may be more effective, certeris 
paribus, in extracting a much higher rate of tax revenue than absolutist 
regimes. Meanwhile, the differences in levels of fiscal revenue could, with 
important qualifications, also be reflective of large differentials in 
developments of fiscal and financial institutions and perhaps gaps in per 
capita income. Indeed, other studies point to the combination of low 
shares of fiscal revenue, high interest rates and low levels of financial 
                                                                                                                                         
national character of the English parliament allowed it to centralize rent-seeking and 
collectively bargain with the crown. This contrasted with other more decentralized 
absolutist states such as Spain and France where faction-based or parcelized rent-
seeking persisted. In these states, rising fiscal needs increased state dependence on 
tax-farming, venality, and other short-term measures susceptible to corruption. Also 
see Acemoglu et al 2005 another variation of this argument.    
32 Indeed, the only viable public borrowing started in the late 19th century between the 
Qing state and Western merchants and bankers who had the backing of Western 
colonial presence in the case of default. See Zhou Yumin 2000, pp.277-287 also for 
cases of imperial Qing‘s forced borrowing. Also see Epstein 2000, chapter 2, 
specifically p. 27 for how overseas capital markets or financial intermediaries in 
Western Europe could bind absolutist rulers to repayment of public debt. 
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intermediation as symbiotic with low per capita incomes that 
characterized contemporary underdevelopment (Besley and Ghatak 
forthcoming, Besley and Persson forthcoming, Acemuglu 2005).  
Available evidence shows that for the 17th and 18th centuries, private 
interest rates in traditional China exhibited a wide variation, but even the 
lower end averaged about 20%, a rate that was possibly four or five times 
the level of that in England and the Netherlands (see Peng et al., 2006 for 
China and Epstein 2000 for Europe).  And this ratio reversed for real 
wage rates of unskilled urban workers where the Chinese rates for the 
17-19th centuries were probably a third or less of those in those two 
European countries (Allen et all 2011). This factor price ratio differential at 
the two ends of Eurasia forms a sharp contrast to the measures of 
imperial unity and dynastic stability.   
 
 
Conclusion 
Through a narrative model of the Chinese state, this article stresses 
the importance of institutions as a determinant to both the long-run 
economic trajectory and the great divergence between China and 
Western Europe in the early modern era.  The very long-run view of two 
millennia reveals political centralization under a unitary monopoly rule in 
China as an endogenous historical process propelled by escalation of 
warfare and warfare mobilization. Geography based explanation of 
China‘s centralization (as opposed to the polar case of European 
fragmentation), as Jared Diamond famously surmised, seems insufficient 
(see Diamond 1997, chapter 16).  Momentous institutional transformation 
as occurred in China‘s Tang-Song transition era laid the political 
foundation for China‘s superior historical record of imperial unity and 
dynastic longevity. This historical process is endogenous in the sense 
monopoly of rule and a long time horizon of rule, once established, 
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predisposed the imperial rule towards a path of low-extraction co-existing 
with a relatively free private economy, which itself would then further 
reinforce political stability. Conversely, large and often exogenous such 
as external threat could also reverse this process and trigger the dynastic 
cycles of rock, scissors, paper. The Qing imperial rule presented in this 
paper is an exemplary demonstration of this political economy model.   
The ideology of unitary rule conditioned on the elimination of inter-
state competition may have given rise to a peculiar Chinese form of 
political legitimacy based on cross-dynastic competition (see Yang Liang-
sheng 2005, pp. 30-42). History and particularly the lessons of dynastic 
fall served as mirrors to confront the current and future imperial rulers. 
Hence, imperial compilation of dynastic annals itself was essential 
exercise of political legitimization. Hence, this particular ideology of 
legitimacy developed under a stable unitary imperial rule in China tended 
towards both inward and backward looking. Indeed, even the most ardent 
critics of imperial rule like Huang Zhongxi or Gu Yanwu had to comb 
through China‘s age of antiquity for better models of governance. 
The Chinese model of absolutism contrasts with the Western 
European political structure where co-existence of inter-state competition 
and political representation may have helped resolve the fundamental 
incentive and information problems that beset an unitary and centralized 
empire like China.  The much more unstable political structure in Western 
Europe may also have provided more dynamism to allow the emergence 
and evolution of institutions conducive to contract and information 
intensive sectors and possibly a high-wage, low interest-rate economy by 
the early modern era. Indeed, if we accept Robert Allen‘s recent 
argument on the importance of differential factor prices – a higher ratio of 
wage prices to those of capital and resource prices in England than in 
China – in being instrumental in inducing the Industrial Revolution in 
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England rather than in China; I argue these differential factor prices 
themselves need to be explained rather than taken as exogenous.  
The onslaught of mid-19th century Western imperialism, this time 
descended from China‘s coastal fringes in the South rather than its 
Northern frontier of steppes and deserts, became a permanent challenge 
to the traditional Chinese rule of legitimacy through the imposition of a 
new global system of inter-state competition. The need for the Chinese 
state to response to the Western imperial challenge eventually translated 
into a modernization or Westernization movement. Curiously, it was from 
the fountain of traditional ideology of centralization that sprang the 
intellectual inspiration of modernization in China or in East Asia in 
general. Indeed, Meiji Japan‘s swift and aggressive establishment of a 
centralized prefectural system over a fragmented Togkugawa feudal 
order owed its success to this Chinese ideology (see Feng Tianyu, 
chapter 4). The Nationalist movement in China‘s Republic era in early 20th 
century deemed unification and centralization as the cornerstone to 
counter Western and by then Japanese imperialism. Mao Zhedong, the 
founding father of Communist China drew as much intellectual inspiration 
from the first emperor of Qin, and Liu Zongyuan‘s theory of centralized 
absolutism as from the Stalinist Soviet (Feng Tianyu p.65).  Even in 
today‘s era of reform and open-up, institutional features strikingly 
reminiscent of a centralized and authoritarian administrative system in 
traditional Chinese political order - the central appointment of officials, 
rotating system of bureaucratic posts, decentralized fiscal policy and even 
the coping mechanism of relying on information asymmetry to preserve 
local autonomy – are remarkably resilient and even hailed as the 
institutional foundation behind China‘s economic miracle of the last three 
decades.33  Indeed, in this new global world order marked by inter-state 
competition, China‘s long tradition of centralized bureaucratic rule turned 
                                               
33 See Qian and Weingast 1997 and Xu, Chenggang forthcoming.  
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out to be a powerful tool for achieving the state objective of economic 
catch-up with the West, and Japan, or even the East Asian tigers. 
Whether or not, however, in the continued absence of any concrete 
political representation, this catch-up would sustain, or China could finally 
step beyond the long shadows of history cast by the dynastic cycles of 
rock, scissors, paper, remains to be seen.    
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Appendix Table. Chinese Dynasties, Years of Unification and Incidences 
of Warfare 
Chinese Dynasties  Years 
Number 
of Years 
per 
dynasty 
Years 
China 
was 
Unified 
Number 
of years 
Unified  
Number 
of 
recorded 
warfare 
Average 
number of 
warfare 
per year 
Spring and Autumn 
Period 春秋 
770 BC — 
476 BC 294   395     1.34 
Warring States 
Period 戰國 
475 BC — 
221 BC 254   230 0.91 
Qin 秦 
221 BC — 
206 BC 15 
221BC - 
209 BC 15 10 0.67 
Western Han 西漢 
206 BC — 
AD 24 229 
111BC - 
AD 22 132 124 0.54 
Eastern Han 東漢 25 — 220 195 50 - 184 134 277 1.42 
Three Kingdoms  
三國 220 — 265 45   71 1.58 
Western Jin 西晉 265 — 317 52 280-301 21 84 1.62 
Eastern Jin  東晉 317 — 420 103   272 2.64 
Southern and 
Northern Dynasties 
南北朝 420 — 589 169   178 1.05 
Sui  隋 581 - 618 37 589-616 27 88 2.38 
Tang  唐 618 — 907 289 624-755 131 193 0.67 
Five Dynasties and 
Ten Kingdoms  
五代十國 907 — 960 53   73 1.38 
Northern Song  北宋 960 — 1127 167   255 1.53 
Southern Song 南宋 1127 — 1279 152   294 1.93 
Yuan 元 1280 — 1368 88 
1279-
1351 72 204 2.32 
Ming明 1368 — 1644 276 
1382-
1618 236 578 2.09 
Qing清 1644 — 1911 268 
1683-
1850 167 426 1.59 
Total  2686  935 3752 1.40 
 
Source: Number of Years China was unified one rule was calculated from Ge Jianxiong, 2008 pp. 
218-224; Number of warfare calculated from China‘s Military History Editorial Committee (ed.), A 
Chronology of Warfare in Dynastic China (Zhongguo Lidai Zhanzheng Nianbiao).  
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